

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA**  
**SHREVEPORT DIVISION**

**HORACE ROBERSON**                           **CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-958-P**  
**VERSUS**                                       **JUDGE FOOTE**  
**J. WHITTINGTON, ET AL.**                   **MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY**

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report, and recommendation.

**STATEMENT OF CLAIM**

Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff Horace Roberson (“Plaintiff”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint was received and filed in this court on June 28, 2016. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Bossier Medium Correctional Center in Plain Dealing, Louisiana. He names J. Whittington and the Bossier Parish Sheriff Department as defendants.

Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2015, he was written up for aggravated fighting. He claims that on December 23, 2015, the Bossier Parish Sheriff Department charged him with second degree battery for the same incident.

Plaintiff claims that on January 4, 2016, he appeared before the disciplinary court and was convicted of the charge and sentenced to restitution for medical expenses, 90 days loss of good time, and 12 weeks loss of commissary.

Plaintiff claims the charge for second degree battery is depriving him of his liberty and violating his right against double jeopardy.

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to have all criminal charges dismissed.

### **LAW AND ANALYSIS**

Plaintiff seeks to have his state court charges dismissed. Although Plaintiff submitted his claim on the standardized civil rights complaint form, it is incumbent upon this court to determine preliminarily whether the facts alleged establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, or whether the claim is one which must be pursued initially in a habeas corpus proceeding. This determination is made by focusing on "the scope of relief actually sought." Alexander v. Ware, 417 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1983); Serio v. Members of the La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987).

When a claimant challenges the very fact or duration of his physical confinement and seeks an immediate release or speedier release from confinement as relief, he must pursue his claim through an application for writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (1973). In accordance with this guideline, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a "per se rule barring consideration of claims under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 that directly or indirectly challenge the constitutionality of the state conviction or sentencing decision under which the claimant is currently confined." Serio, 821 F.2d at 1117 (citing Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (1977)). Plaintiff is challenging his state court charges and his current detention for those charges, therefore his complaint is clearly seeking habeas relief.

Habeas corpus relief is available to a person who is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, the right to pursue habeas relief in federal court is not unqualified. It is well settled that a petitioner seeking federal habeas corpus relief cannot collaterally attack his state court conviction in federal court until he has exhausted all available state remedies. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982); Minor v. Lucas, 697 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1983).

Eligibility to proceed under Section 2241 depends upon the fulfillment of two prerequisites. The statute itself requires that petitioner must be "in custody" in order to seek habeas relief. Once petitioner has met this prerequisite, he must then show that he has exhausted available state remedies. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 433 (1983). The exhaustion requirement is a judicial abstention policy developed "to protect the state courts' opportunity to confront and resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as well as to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process." Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1987).

Furthermore, pretrial habeas relief is not a tool which can be used to derail or interfere with a state's criminal process. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 442 (1973). Absent exceptional circumstances, this court is not authorized to interfere with state trial court proceedings. Braden, supra.

Based on the timing of the charges and the filing of Plaintiff's complaint, it is apparent he has not exhausted available state remedies prior to filing his petition in this court. This

requirement is not a jurisdictional bar but a procedural one erected in the interest of comity providing state courts first opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional violations. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438, 443 (1971); Rose v. Lundy, supra.

Accordingly;


**IT IS RECOMMENDED** that Plaintiff's complaint be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and be **DENIED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjection-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

**THUS DONE AND SIGNED**, in chambers, at Shreveport, Louisiana, on this the  
28th day of July, 2016.



Mark L. Hornsby  
U.S. Magistrate Judge